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On Dummett’s Pragmatist Justification
Procedure
Hermo´genes Oliveira
Abstract
I show that propositional intuitionistic logic is complete with re-
spect to an adaptation of Dummett’s pragmatist justification proce-
dure. In particular, given a pragmatist justification of an argument, I
show how to obtain a natural deduction derivation of the conclusion
of the argument from, at most, the same assumptions.
1 Introduction
Proof-theoretic definitions of validity can be considered as loosely inspired
by Wittgenstein’s ideas relating meaning and use. They attempt to explain
of the concept of logical validity in terms of the deductive use of the log-
ical constants, as expressed by inference rules. In this context, Gentzen’s
investigations into deduction, particularly his calculus of natural deduction,
are often used as a starting point for explaining the meaning of the logical
constants on the basis of rules governing their use.
In the standard natural deduction calculus [6, 10], the deductive use of a
logical constant is governed by its introduction and elimination rules. Thus,
from a semantic perspective where meaning is explained on the basis of use,
the introduction and elimination rules express the canonical manner in which
a sentence with a logical constant as main operator is used in a deductive
argument: the introduction rules express the canonical use of the sentence as
a conclusion, the elimination rules express the canonical use of the sentence
as an assumption. Along these lines, Dummett [2, 3] proposed that the
analysis of the deductive meaning of a logical constant into introduction
and elimination rules accounts for two distinct aspects of its use. Roughly
speaking, the introduction rules show how to establish a sentence, or to
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warrant its assertion; they stand for the verificationist aspect. On the other
hand, the elimination rules show what consequences can be extracted from
a sentence, or what difference accepting it makes to our practice; they stand
for the pragmatist aspect.
Accordingly, in a verificationist approach to proof-theoretic semantics,
valid arguments are defined on the basis of introductions rules. The main idea
is that an argument is valid if, whenever we can obtain the assumptions in a
canonical manner, we can also obtain the conclusion in a canonical manner.
In a pragmatist approach, on the other hand, valid arguments are defined on
the basis of elimination rules. The main idea is that any consequence that
can be drawn in a canonical manner from the conclusion can also be drawn
in a canonical manner from the assumptions.
Prawitz [11, 16] and Dummett [2, 3] conjectured that proof-theoretic ap-
proaches to logical semantics would result in an intuitionistic, or construc-
tive, notion of validity. Due to bias towards the verificationist point of view,
proof-theoretic definitions of validity have often been approached via intro-
duction rules [11, 13, 14, 16, 19]. Unfortunately, with respect to their ade-
quacy to intuitionistic logic, verificationist proposals ran into some problems
[17, 18, 9, 8, 7].
However, as suggested by some remarks of Gentzen [6], the introduction
and elimination rules for a logical constant are harmoniously related, such
that one could extract, in some sense, the elimination rules from the introduc-
tion rules and vice versa. The harmony between introduction and elimination
rules suggests that the elimination rules could just as well provide a basis
upon which to develop a proof-theoretic definition of validity.
The pragmatist proof-theoretic approach to validity, the one based on
elimination rules, has received comparatively less attention [3, 15, 22]. In
this paper, I show that propositional intuitionistic logic is complete with re-
spect to an adaptation of Dummett’s pragmatist proof-theoretic definition
of validity. I adapt Dummett’s definitions lightly in order to avoid prob-
lems and objections but otherwise stay as closely as possible to the original
framework.
2 Preliminaries
This section explains the basic notions and terminology. It also recalls and
restates results and definitions that will be needed later.
2
2.1 Terminology and notation
I borrow most of the terminology from Dummett [3] himself. A notewor-
thy difference is the use of the term “assumption” in place of Dummett’s
term “initial premiss”. I included this subsection in the interest of self-
containment, but it can be safely skipped if you are already familiar with the
notation and typographical conventions used in natural deduction.
The language. We consider a propositional language with infinitely many
propositional variables (atomic sentences) and the propositional logical con-
stants: → (implication), ∨ (disjunction), ∧ (conjunction) and ⊥ (absurdity).
The complex sentences of the language are formed from atomic sentences
by means of composition with the logical constants in the usual way. Latin
letters (A, B, C etc.) are used to stand for arbitrary sentences of the lan-
guage and Greek letters (Γ and ∆) to stand for finite collections of sentences.
Subscripts are used whenever it is necessary or convenient. The degree of a
sentence is the number of logical constants that occur in it.
Arguments and derivations. Formally, arguments can be considered as
trees of sentence occurrences (designated with Π, possibly with subscripts).
They are constructed from top to bottom, from the leaves to the root, by
inferences. These inferences lead from one or more sentences, the premisses,
to a single sentence, the consequence. In an argument, each premiss of an
inference is either a leaf of the tree or the consequence of a previous inference.
Thus, argument trees are formal representations of the process of argumen-
tation, or reasoning, with some leaves acting as assumptions and the root
acting as the conclusion of the argument. Any occurrence of a sentence in an
argument determine, in the obvious way, a subargument with that sentence
as conclusion.1 A path in an argument is a sequence of sentence occurrences
such that each sentence in the path is an immediate inferential consequence
of the previous one.2 Every leaf in an argument is initially an assumption,
albeit assumptions can be discharged by inferences.3 After an assumption is
1As a limiting case, a single sentence occurrence is an argument with that sentence
acting as both assumption and conclusion.
2Again, as a limiting case, a single sentence occurrence measures an empty path from
that sentence occurrence to itself.
3An axiom or logical theorem A can be considered the result of an inference from leaf
A to conclusion A that discards the leaf occurrence of A.
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discharged by an inference, the argument, starting from the consequence of
that inference, does not depend any more on the assumption. The discharge
of assumptions are indicated using square brackets with numeric indices used
to pinpoint the particular inference discharging the assumption. Whenever
it is clear from context, the numeric indices are left implicit. I write 〈Γ, A〉 to
denote an argument from assumptions Γ (those that remained undischarged
throughout the argument) to conclusion A without paying attention to the
argumentation process that goes from Γ to A. Also, for the sake of simplicity,
I often talk about sentences when I actually mean occurrences of sentences in
an argument, and similarly with respect to inference rules and the particular
inferences resulting from their application.
Propositional intuitionistic logic is characterised by the standard system
of natural deduction [6, 10]. The inference rules for the propositional connec-
tives are symmetrically distributed between introduction (I) and elimination
(E) rules.
[A]
....
B
A→ B → I
A A→ B
B
→ E
A B
A ∧B ∧I
A ∧B
A
∧E A ∧B
B
∧E
A
A ∨B ∨I
B
A ∨B ∨I
A ∨B
[A]
....
C
[B]
....
C
C
∨E
Negation (¬) can be defined as usual in terms of implication and absurdity.
The rule for the absurdity logical constant⊥ can be considered an elimination
rule. ⊥
A
⊥E
Natural deduction derivations are a particular subclass of arguments in which
every inference is in accordance with one of the inference rules above.
4
2.2 Elimination rules and related notions
In an elimination rule for a logical constant, exactly one premiss of the rule
is required to have that constant as main logical operator. This premiss is
called the major premiss, and all others, if there are any others, are called
minor premisses.
In an elimination rule, a minor premiss is vertical if the same sentence
figures as both minor premiss and consequence of the rule, otherwise it is
called horizontal. An elimination rule is a vertical rule if at least one of its
minor premisses is vertical and it allows the discharge of assumptions in the
subarguments for its vertical minor premisses. We can and shall assume that
every application of vertical elimination rules do in fact discharge the as-
sumptions as indicated by the rule.4 Elimination rules which are not vertical
are called reductive.
2.3 Normal derivations
This subsection recollects some results and fixes some terminology regard-
ing normal derivations in propositional intuitionistic logic. The results are
restated mainly for your convenience and to avoid confusion resulting from
conflicting terminology. For detailed proofs, please resort to Prawitz’s mono-
graphs [10, 11].
Definition 2.1. A track 5 in an argument Π is a sequence of sentence occur-
rences A1, · · ·An such that:
(i) A1 is a leaf in Π that is not discharged by an application of a vertical
elimination rule
(ii) Ai, for each i < n, is not a horizontal minor premiss of an application
of an elimination rule, and either (1) Ai is not a major premiss of a
vertical rule and Ai+1 is the sentence immediately below A, or (2) Ai is
a major premiss of a vertical rule and Ai+1 is the assumption discharged
by the respective application of the rule
4Otherwise, the application of the elimination rule would be superfluous [10, p. 49–50].
This is in line with Dummett [3, p. 283].
5The notion of “track” is obviously a slight adaptation of Prawitz’s notion of “path”.
Since the term “path” is already reserved for a different concept, the term “track” is used
in order to avoid confusion.
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(iii) An is either a horizontal minor premiss or the conclusion of Π
As a sequence of occurrences of sentences, a track can also be divided
into segments ; they conflate repeated consecutive occurrences of the same
sentence that arise from applications of vertical elimination rules. If the first
sentence in a track is an assumption of the argument, the track is open in
the argument, otherwise it is closed.
The tracks in an argument can be assigned an order. The lowest order
is assigned to tracks whose last sentence occurrence is the conclusion of the
argument; they are called main tracks. The order then increases progressively
through horizontal minor premisses. The major premiss of the horizontal rule
belongs to a parent track which, of course, can have other children tracks
sharing an immediately higher order than their parents. The last sentence
occurrence in a track determines a subargument, or subderivation, whose
order is the order of the track. The progeny relationship between tracks can
be naturally extended to cover them.
Theorem 2.1. Let τ be a track in a normal intuitionistic derivation and
let σ1 · · ·σn be the corresponding sequence of segments in τ . Then there is
a segment σi, called the base segment in τ , which separates two (possibly
empty) parts of τ , called the analytic part and the synthetic part of τ , such
that:
(i) for each σj in the analytic part, σj is a major premiss of an elimination
rule and the sentence occurring in σj+1 is a subsentence of the one
occurring in σj
(ii) the base segment σi is a premiss of an introduction rule or of ⊥E,
provided i 6= n
(iii) for each σj in the synthetic part, except the last one, σj is a premiss of
an introduction rule and the sentence occurring in σj is a subsentence
of the one occurring in σj+1
Definition 2.2. The subsentences of a sentence A are classified as positive
or negative as follows:
• A is a positive subsentence of A
• if B ∧C or B ∨C are positive (resp. negative) subsentences of A, then
B and C are positive (resp. negative) subsentences of A
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• if B → C is a positive (resp. negative) subsentence of A, then B is a
negative (resp. positive) subsentence of A and C is a positive (resp.
negative) subsentence of A
Definition 2.3. A sentence A is an assumption component (resp. conclusion
component) of an argument 〈Γ, G〉 when A is a positive (resp. negative) sub-
sentence of some assumption in Γ, or a negative (resp. positive) subsentence
of the conclusion G.
The notions defined above can be naturally extended to cover segments,
whereby a segment σj is a subsegment of a segment σi if the sentence occur-
ring in σj is a subsentence of the sentence occurring in σi.
Theorem 2.2. Let σ1 · · ·σn be a track in a normal derivation of G from Γ.
It holds that:
(i) every segment occurring in the analytic part is an assumption compo-
nent of 〈Γ, G〉 and subsegment of σ1
(ii) the base segment σi is an assumption component of 〈Γ, G〉 and a sub-
segment of σ1; also, if different from ⊥, σi is a conclusion component
of 〈Γ, G〉 and a subsegment of σn
(iii) every segment occurring in the synthetic part is a conclusion component
of 〈Γ, G〉 and a subsegment of σn
Theorem 2.3 below provides a complexity measure for normal derivations
that decreases on the order of the tracks. This complexity measure is later
employed in Definition 3.6 and Definition 3.7.
Definition 2.4. A negative assumption (resp. conclusion) component of
an argument 〈Γ, G〉 is a negative subsentence of G (resp. some sentence in
Γ). Analogously, a positive conclusion (resp. assumption) component of an
argument 〈Γ, G〉 is a positive subsentence of G (resp. some sentence in Γ).
The negative and positive partitions introduced in Definition 2.4 make
out the components in Definition 2.3. The assumption and conclusion com-
ponents afford a coarse summary of the sentences occurring in the elimination
and introduction parts of tracks in a normal derivation on the basis of its
assumptions and conclusion. Their partition into negative and positive con-
stituents yields a somewhat finer distinction.
7
Definition 2.5. A distinctive assumption (resp. conclusion) component of
an argument is either a negative assumption (resp. conclusion) component
or an assumption (resp. the conclusion).
The distinctive assumption components correspond intuitively to first sen-
tences (leaves) of tracks. They are either assumptions or, possibly, leaves dis-
charged by applications of →I and, consequently, negative subsentences of
the conclusion. The negative assumption components represent, in a sense,
a potential discharge. Whether an actual leaf was discharged would depend
on the particular derivation.
The distinctive conclusion components correspond intuitively to last sen-
tences (roots) of tracks. They include the conclusion of main tracks and,
possibly, conclusions of their descendant tracks. More precisely, provided a
parent track is open, the conclusion of a child track is a negative subsentence
of its assumption.
Definition 2.6 (Dershowitz and Manna [1]). The degree of a collection of
sentences ∆j is lower than the degree of a collection of sentences ∆i (∆j <
∆i) if, and only if, ∆j results from ∆i by replacing one or more sentences
with a finite collection of sentences of lower degree.
Lemma 2.1. In a normal derivation, the degree of the collection of distinc-
tive conclusion components never increases on the order of subderivations.
In particular, if a parent track is closed, then the collection of distinctive
conclusion components of the child subderivation has lower degree.
Proof. Consider derivations Πi and Πj, where Πj is a child of Πi. I show
that any distinctive conclusion component of Πj is either itself a distinctive
conclusion component of Πi, or is replaced in Πi with a distinctive conclu-
sion component of higher degree. By Definition 2.5, a distinctive conclusion
component of Πj is either the conclusion of Πj or a negative conclusion com-
ponent of Πj. First, consider the negative conclusion components of Πj. By
Definition 2.4, they also belong to the distinctive conclusion components of
Πi, unless the corresponding assumption was discharged. In that case, by
Theorem 2.1, either (→I) the conclusion of Πi has higher degree, or (∨E)
it is a negative subsentence of some assumption in Πi and, consequently, a
negative conclusion component of Πi. Now consider the conclusion of Πj.
Take a parent track τ in Πi. Suppose that τ is open and A is its assumption.
By Theorem 2.2, it is a negative subsentence of A and, by Definition 2.5, also
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a distinctive conclusion component of Πi. Finally, suppose that τ is closed
and its leaf A was discharged. Then, by Theorem 2.1, the conclusion of Πi
has higher degree than the conclusion of Πj.
Definition 2.7. Let ∆Γ (resp. ∆G) stand for the collection of distinctive
assumption (resp. conclusion) components of a normal derivation from Γ
to G. Consider sequences of subderivations 〈Γ0, G0〉 · · · 〈Γn, Gn〉 where each
element stands for a child subderivation of the previous one (〈Γ0, G0〉 being
the main derivation). The derivations in the sequence are measured for their
complexity as follows:
• if ∆Gj < ∆Gi then 〈Γj, Gj〉 ≺ 〈Γi, Gi〉
• if ∆Gj = ∆Gi then
– if ∆Γj < ∆Γi then 〈Γj, Gj〉 ≺ 〈Γi, Gi〉
– if ∆Γj ≥ ∆Γi then 〈Γj, Gj〉  〈Γi, Gi〉
Theorem 2.3. For any derivable argument, there is a normal derivation
where the complexity decreases on the order of subderivations.
Proof. I describe a method to shorten normal derivations by removing redun-
dancies (loops). Consider a normal derivation where a subderivation Πj has
equal or higher complexity than its parent subderivation Πi. By Lemma 2.1,
a parent track is open. Let Ai be its assumption. Now, there is also an open
track in Πj where another occurrence Aj of the same sentence is an analytic
assumption, because otherwise Πj would already have lower complexity than
Πi. Let Πk be the descendant subderivation for the minor premiss of Aj.
Replace Πj with Πk. Because Πj has at least the same complexity as Πi, any
negative assumption components of Πj is also a negative assumption compo-
nent of Πi. Therefore, any discharge of assumptions of Πk can be transferred
from Πj to Πi. This shortening process can be iterated until the resulting
child of Πi has lower complexity.
3 Proof-theoretic validity
The proof-theoretic justification procedures proposed by Dummett [3] consist
of definitions of validity for arguments based on canonical inference rules for
9
the logical constants. These inference rules fix the meaning of the logical con-
stants by expressing their canonical deductive use. They are, in Dummett’s
terminology, self-justifying.
In contrast with common practice [11, 12, 19, 22], Dummett’s definitions
are not based on semantic clauses for particular logical constants. Instead,
he assumes that self-justifying rules are given. These self-justifying rules are
introduction rules in the context of the verificationist procedure, and elimi-
nation rules in the context of the pragmatist procedure. In both procedures,
the definitions are stated irrespective of the particular constants or rules pro-
vided. Dummett’s approach is thus more general and could, in principle, be
applied to any logic.6 For our particular case, the self-justifying rules are the
standard elimination rules of propositional intuitionistic logic: ∧E, →E, ∨E
and ⊥E.
From a pragmatist perspective, a canonical argument start from open
(usually complex) assumptions and, through applications of elimination rules,
arrive at an atomic conclusion. Dummett also admits basic rules (or bound-
ary rules) to determine deducibility among atomic sentences. In canonical
arguments, these basic rules can be applied to an atomic conclusion in order
to obtain further atomic consequences.
However, since our main concern is with logical validity, I leave basic rules
out of the picture and adapt Dummett’s definitions accordingly, for the sake
of simplicity.7 I also adapt the definitions to the propositional case.
Definition 3.1. A sentence occurrence in an argument is principal if every
sentence (inclusive) in the path down to the conclusion (exclusive) is a major
premiss of an elimination rule.8
6For technical reasons, the approach would certainly be restricted at the outset to
logics with nice proof-theoretic properties (normalisation, subformula property and etc.),
however there is no intrinsic technical limitation that confines it to intuitionistic logic or
some specific formulation thereof.
7Dummett [3, p. 273] explicitly stated the irrelevance of basic rules, or boundary rules,
as he called them, to logical validity. Furthermore, by reflection on the pragmatist defini-
tion of validity (Definition 3.8), it is easy to see that any basic rule in the complementation
can be transferred to the valid canonical argument required, thus making no difference to
which complex arguments are actually validated.
8As a limiting case, in an argument consisting of a single occurrence of a sentence A,
acting both as assumption and conclusion, A is principal, since the empty path from A to
A satisfies the definition.
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Definition 3.2. An argument is proper if at least one of its assumptions is
principal.
The concept of proper argument is an essential component in the pragma-
tist notion of validity because proper arguments are built from the principal
assumption by application of elimination rules. Arguments that do not fol-
low this pattern are improper. The path from the principal assumption to
the conclusion is the principal path.
The notion of canonical argument to be introduced later (Definition 3.4)
is based primarily on the notion of a proper argument. Even in proper ar-
guments, however, the subargument for minor premisses of elimination rules
may depend on auxiliary assumptions that arrive at the conclusion through
improper means, i. e., through a path that is not solely composed of major
premisses of elimination. These kind of improper subarguments for minor
premisses of elimination are called critical subarguments (Definition 3.5).
3.1 Canonical arguments and critical subarguments
The following definitions are adapted from Dummett’s original definitions as
explained in Section 3.2. The core ideas, however, are preserved.
Definition 3.3. A sentence occurrence is placid if no sentence down the
path to the conclusion is a horizontal minor premiss.
Definition 3.4. A canonical argument has the following properties:
(i) it is proper;
(ii) the subargument for any placid vertical minor premiss of an elimination
rule is proper.
Definition 3.5. A critical subargument of a canonical argument is a non-
canonical subargument whose conclusion is a horizontal minor premiss of an
elimination rule.
In subarguments for minor premisses, the notion of canonicity deals with
vertical and horizontal minor premisses differently. The subarguments for
vertical minor premisses are considered independent auxiliary arguments and
are thus required to be proper themselves. Ideally, the subarguments for
horizontal minor premisses would also be proper (and canonical). However,
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in general, it is not possible to place any restrictions on the form of the
subarguments for horizontal minor premisses: when not already canonical,
those subarguments are critical, which means that the validity of the whole
canonical argument would depend on their validity (Definition 3.6).
Remark 3.1. The inference steps in canonical arguments consist primarily of
applications of elimination rules: there is a principal path (which is composed
of eliminations) and subarguments for minor premisses which are themselves
either proper (again with a principal path composed of eliminations) or crit-
ical. Thus, a canonical argument has the general form
· · ·· · ·
· · · 5
· · · 5
· · ·
· · · 5
· · ·· · · 5
· · ·
where the inference steps are applications of elimination rules except for
the critical subarguments (represented with “5” above), because the defi-
nitions impose no restrictions on their inference steps. If we were to ignore
the critical subarguments, what remained could be called the proper fraction
of the canonical argument and the corresponding sentence occurrences be
called proper occurrences. In the proper fraction, in addition to the princi-
pal assumption, all other assumptions are principal assumptions of proper
subarguments. In the context of canonical arguments, they are called, collec-
tively, proper leaves, or proper assumptions, when undischarged throughout
the argument.
Lemma 3.1. The conclusion of a canonical argument is always a subsentence
of some assumption, provided there is no proper occurrence of ⊥.
Proof. Let Π be a canonical argument with no proper occurrence of ⊥. By
Definition 3.4, Π is proper and, by Definition 3.2 and Definition 3.1, it has
a principal path of major premisses of applications of elimination rules from
an assumption to the conclusion. In the principal path, the consequences
of applications of ∧E and →E are subsentences of their respective major
premisses. The interesting cases are applications of vertical rules (∨E) since
they figure a consequence which is not required to be a subsentence of the
major premiss. By Definition 3.4, the subarguments for minor premisses of
vertical rules are proper. By Definition 3.2 and Definition 3.1, each vertical
subargument has a path of eliminations from a proper leaf to the conclusion
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of the subargument. Now, if the proper leaf of a subargument for a verti-
cal minor premiss was discharged by the corresponding application of ∨E,
then the conclusion is, by induction hypothesis, a subsentence of its major
premiss and hence a subsentence of the principal assumption. Otherwise, if
the proper leaf was not discharged, then it is actually a proper assumption
of the canonical argument and the conclusion is, by induction hypothesis, a
subsentence of this assumption.
Remark 3.2. It would perhaps be useful to make a parallel between the defini-
tions above and concepts familiar from normalisation for intuitionistic natural
deduction (Section 2.3). For instance, notice that clause (ii) of Definition 3.4
ensures that the segments in main tracks of canonical arguments are all ma-
jor premisses of applications of elimination rules (except the last one). In
main tracks of canonical arguments, the major premisses of vertical rules are
followed by the corresponding discharged assumption, which (if not the last
segment in the track) is also a major premiss of an elimination rule. As a
result, the first sentence in a main track is a proper assumption and the last
sentence (the conclusion of the canonical argument) is a subsentence of this
assumption, provided ⊥ does not occur in the main track. The first sentence
in a main track, however, can be distinct from the principal assumption of
the canonical argument, because assumptions discharged by vertical rules
need not be principal in the proper subargument for a minor premiss. The
tracks to whom the principal assumption belongs may be called principal
tracks. By Theorem 2.1, in normal derivations with empty synthetic parts,
the main tracks are all principal tracks and the derivations are, therefore,
canonical arguments.
Definition 3.6. A canonical argument is valid if all its critical subarguments
are valid and of lower complexity.
Definition 3.7. A complementation of an argument 〈Γ, G〉 is the result of
replacing G by a valid canonical argument with the following properties:9
(i) it has G as principal assumption
(ii) it has an atomic conclusion
9Dummett’s original definition has a special clause for when the conclusion G is an
atomic sentence. His clause is subsumed here by canonical arguments consisting of a
single occurrence of G (Definition 3.1).
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(iii) it has at most the same complexity
Definition 3.8. An argument is valid if there is an effective method to
transform any complementation of it into a valid canonical argument for the
same conclusion from, at most, the same assumptions.
Definition 3.6, Definition 3.7 and Definition 3.8 should always be consid-
ered together since they define notions in terms of each other. For instance,
the notion of valid canonical argument in Definition 3.6 is defined in terms
of the notion of valid argument which is itself only defined in Definition 3.8.
The process of complementation consists basically in the application of
elimination rules to the conclusion of the argument until we reach an atomic
sentence. During complementation, the application of elimination rules fig-
uring minor premisses can introduce auxiliary assumptions. Thus, the valid
canonical argument required by Definition 3.8 can depend on additional as-
sumptions introduced by complementation.
Theorem 3.1 (Completeness of Intuitionistic Logic). If an argument 〈Γ, G〉
is valid, then there is a natural deduction derivation of G from Γ in intu-
itionistic logic.
Proof. Suppose 〈Γ, G〉 is valid. By Definition 3.8, for any complementation
Πc, we have a valid canonical argument Πv with, at most, the same assump-
tions and the same conclusion. By Definition 3.7, the complementations
are obtained by replacing G with a valid canonical argument that has G
as principal assumption. By Definition 3.2, there is a principal path in Πc
from G to the atomic conclusion C which consists solely of applications of
elimination rules. Furthermore, there can be auxiliary assumptions ∆ in the
subarguments for minor premisses of elimination rules in the principal path.
Complementation Valid Canonical Argument Derivation
Γ
G, ∆....
C (Πc)
Γ,∆....
C (Πv)
Γ,∆....
C (Πd)
By Definition 3.8, the valid canonical argument Πv have C as conclusion and,
at most, Γ,∆ as assumptions. We use Πv as base and assume that we already
have a natural deduction derivation Πd for C from Γ,∆ obtained by recursive
application of the procedure described here to the critical subarguments of
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Πv.
10 Then, we go through the applications of elimination rules in the prin-
cipal path and construct, through a process of inversion, a natural deduction
derivation of G from Γ alone. Starting with C, we obtain a natural deduction
derivation for each principal sentence in the principal path until we reach G
(at which point we would have either discarded or discharged the auxiliary
assumptions ∆). Since Definition 3.8 ensures a valid canonical argument Πv
for any complementation Πc, we are free to consider those complementa-
tions that are more convenient for the construction of our natural deduction
derivation. We proceed case by case, where each case shows the derivation
of the major premiss on the basis of derivations of the principal sentences
that came before (ordered from C to G). For the cases of ∨E and →E,
which introduce auxiliary assumptions, I show how these assumptions can
be either discarded (∨E) or discharged (→E). That is, for each occurrence
of ∨E and→E in the principal path of Πc, I show how to obtain a derivation
from only Γ,∆∗, where ∆∗ stands for the auxiliary assumptions except those
assumptions that are being introduced at that particular inference step. As
a result, after going through all sentences in the principal path, we obtain a
derivation of G which depends solely on Γ.
(∧E) Consider complementations by both elimination rules for conjunction
Γ
G, ∆....
A ∧B
A (Πc1)
Γ
G, ∆....
A ∧B
B (Πc2)
Γ,∆....
A (Πd1)
Γ,∆....
B (Πd2)
A ∧B
From the derivations of A and B, the conjunction A ∧B is derived by
∧I.
(→E) Consider a complementation where the minor premiss A is assumed.
Γ
G, ∆∗....
A→ B A
B (Πc)
Γ,∆∗, [A]....
B (Πd)
A→ B
10Recall that a canonical argument is mostly already a natural deduction derivation,
except for the critical subarguments (Remark 3.1). The termination of the recursive
application of the procedure to the critical subarguments of Πv is warranted by the com-
plexity restrictions on critical subarguments (Definition 3.6). Example 4.2 illustrates the
recursive nature of the definitions.
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From a derivation of B from Γ,∆, we apply →I to obtain A → B,
discharging A.
(⊥E) Consider a complementation where C is an atomic sentence which does
not occur as a subsentence in either Γ or ∆. As a result, ⊥E is the last
rule applied. I show that Πd contain a derivation of ⊥ which depends,
at most, on Γ,∆.
Γ
G, ∆....⊥
C (Πc)
Γ,∆....⊥
C (Πd)
By Definition 3.2, Πd has a principal path from one of the assumptions
Γ,∆ to C. Since C is not a subsentence of the principal assumption,
it could only have been obtained by either ⊥E or, possibly, a sequence
of one or more applications of ∨E.11 In the first case, we already have
a derivation of ⊥ from Γ,∆. In the second case, by Definition 3.4, the
subarguments for vertical premisses of ∨E are proper and hence have
a principal path to C. We work our way up applications of ∨E until
we reach an application of a reductive elimination rule. The reductive
elimination rule in question can only be ⊥E (Lemma 3.1). We permute
its application down the sequence of applications of ∨E and thus obtain
a derivation of ⊥ from, at most, Γ,∆.
(∨E) Consider a complementation of the form below, where A→ C and B →
C are assumed and C is atomic and does not occur as a subsentence in
either Γ, A, B or auxiliary assumptions ∆∗ (where ∆∗ does not contain
A→ C and B → C).
Γ
G, ∆∗....
A ∨B
A→ C [A]
C
B → C [B]
C
C (Πc)
In the derivation Πd, the conclusion C could have been obtained:
11The cases where there is an application of ⊥E with a complex consequence containing
C and then further eliminations arriving at C are easily subsumed under the case where
the corresponding application of ⊥E has C directly as a consequence.
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(a) by ⊥E.
Γ,∆∗....⊥
C (Πd)
Γ,∆∗....⊥
A ∨B
It is easy to derive A ∨B instead by the same rule.
(b) by →E from either A → C or, respectively, B → C as principal
assumption.
A/B → C
Γ,∆∗....
A/B
C (Πd)
Γ,∆∗....
A/B
A ∨B
In either case, we obtain a derivation of A∨B from the subderiva-
tion of the horizontal minor premiss by ∨I.
(c) by a sequence of one or more applications of ∨E.
Γ,∆∗....· · ·
A/B → C
Γ,∆∗....
A/B
C
Γ,∆∗....⊥
C
C (Πd)
Γ,∆∗....· · ·
Γ,∆∗....
A/B
A ∨B
Γ,∆∗....⊥
A ∨B
A ∨B
We then consider main tracks in Πd (Remark 3.2) and replace each
occurrence of C in the segment by A ∨ B in accordance with the
previous cases (a) and (b).
The resulting derivation of A ∨ B abstains from assumptions A → C
and B → C. Any doubts can be dispelled by putting the derivation
into normal form (Theorem 2.1).
Theorem 3.2 (Soundness of Intuitionistic Logic). If there is a natural de-
duction derivation of G from Γ, then the argument 〈Γ, G〉 is valid.
Proof. Let Πd be a normal derivation of G from Γ. Now, suppose Πc is a
complementation of Πd from Γ,∆ to conclusion C. I show how to obtain
a valid canonical argument from Γ,∆ to C. By Definition 3.2, G is the
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first of a (possibly empty) sequence of major premisses of applications of
elimination rules and, by Theorem 2.1, the last of a (possibly empty) sequence
of immediate premisses of applications of introduction rules. By induction
on the degree of G, we perform reductions until we obtain a deduction Πv
of C from Γ,∆. By Remark 3.2 and induction hypotheses on its critical
subarguments, Πv is a valid canonical argument for C from Γ,∆.
3.2 Prawitz’s objection
There are subtle issues involved in the treatment of critical subarguments and
Dummett was not able to get his definitions completely right. In particular,
problems emerge when we consider a counterexample pointed out by Prawitz
[15, endnote 15]:
“The main fault [with Dummett’s definitions] is that in a comple-
mentation of an argument, the minor premise of an implication
elimination is only assumed. By not considering complementa-
tions where the minor premise is the end of an arbitrary argument
(which is not possible to do in Dummett’s definition, proceeding
as it does by induction over the degree of arguments), the notion
of validity becomes too weak. In particular, it cannot be shown
that inferences by modus ponens are valid in general, because
given two valid arguments Π and Σ for A → B and A, respec-
tively, there is no guarantee that the result ∆ of combining them
in a modus ponens to conclude B is valid. For an actual coun-
terexample, we may let B be atomic, Π be simply A→ B, which
is a valid argument for A→ B from A→ B, and Σ to be a valid
argument for a nonatomic A from some hypotheses of higher de-
gree than that of A → B. Then ∆ is canonical argument and is
its own complementation, but it is not valid (Σ being of the same
degree as ∆, nor can one find another valid canonical argument
for B from the same hypotheses.”
In his reply to Prawitz, Dummett [4] acknowledges the problem. There
are actually two different issues brought to light by Prawitz’s counterexample.
In the remainder of this section, I discuss these issues and indicate thereby
the adaptations that I incorporated into the original definitions in order to
avoid them. The adaptations, although elaborate, are fully in agreement
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with Dummett’s overall philosophical outlook, particularly with respect to
the treatment of assumptions.
3.2.1 Canonical atomism
Dummett [3, pp. 284,285] discussed an example closely related to Prawitz’s
counterexample.
A→ B
(A→ B)→ ((C → C)→ A) A→ B
A
B (1)
Notice that Dummett’s example is basically an instance of Prawitz’s coun-
terexample: both consist of an argument where major premiss A→ B stands
as an assumption, and where there is a subargument for minor premiss A
from assumptions of higher complexity than A → B. In Dummett’s discus-
sion, however, the minor premiss A is atomic. This contrasts with Prawitz’s
counterexample where A is complex. The difference is important because,
according to Dummett’s original definition (which is divided into clauses), a
canonical argument, besides being proper (clause iii), must have an atomic
conclusion (clause i). Thus, the first problem revealed by Prawitz’s coun-
terexample is that, for complex A, there would be, in general, no canonical
way to obtain A.
However, there is no conceptually compelling reason why canonical argu-
ments must have atomic conclusions. After all, we should be able to obtain
also complex sentences in a canonical manner.12 In order to avoid this ob-
jection, I removed the requirement of atomic conclusion from Dummett’s
original definition of canonical argument and adapted the definition of com-
plementation accordingly (clause (iii) of Definition 3.7).
3.2.2 Stringency of the complexity restriction
When discussing his example (1), Dummett was concerned about improper
and, therefore, non-canonical subarguments for minor premisses: if these kind
of subarguments could have higher complexity than the principal assumption
12I suspect that Dummett only imposed the requirement of atomic conclusion on canon-
ical arguments in order to simplify the formulation of his definition of complementation
which, in general, should require that the principal path be as long as possible in order to
afford a complete analysis of the conclusion.
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(A → B, in this example), the definition of validity would be in danger of
circularity. Dummett then presents a transformation that puts the improper
subargument into proper form.
A→ B
(A→ B)→ ((C → C)→ A) A→ B
(C → C)→ A
[C]
C → C
A
B (2)
Both arguments depend on the same assumptions but, in contrast with
the original example (1), the transformed argument (2) displays a proper
subargument for the minor premiss A, since there is a principal path from
(A→ B)→ ((C → C)→ A) to A.
Apparently relying on the strength of this particular transformation alone,
Dummett then introduces a narrow notion of validity for canonical arguments
which restricts improper arguments for minor premisses to those of strictly
lower degree, where the degree of an argument is the highest among the
degrees of its assumptions and conclusion.
Although the transformation worked for that particular example, it is
inadequate in general, at least if Dummett’s notion of degree of an argument
is used as complexity measure. Consider, for instance, the following proper
argument:
¬(A ∨ ¬A)
¬(A ∨ ¬A)
A ∨ ¬A
⊥
The degree of the minor subargument is equal to the degree of the principal
assumption ¬(A ∨ ¬A). In fact, ¬(A ∨ ¬A) occurs again as an assumption
in the minor subargument. The fact that the minor subargument cannot
be put into a proper form becomes clear when we replace it by its normal
derivation in intuitionistic logic:
¬(A ∨ ¬A)
¬(A ∨ ¬A)
A(1)
A ∨ ¬A
⊥
¬A (1)
A ∨ ¬A
⊥
Dummett’s complexity restriction, as originally formulated, is therefore too
stringent. The approach suggested by Prawitz [15] and Schroeder-Heister [22]
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avoids this problem by dealing primarily with closed proofs, where the con-
clusion provides the adequate complexity measure, since there are no open
assumptions. Their approach thus differs unequivocally from Dummett’s,
especially with respect to the treatment of assumptions. Dummett’s core
approach was maintained through the adoption of an adequate complexity
measure (Definition 2.7), one that preserves soundness (Theorem 2.3), in-
stead of his original notion of degree of an argument.
4 A decision procedure
In order to illustrate the definitions and give some intuition about the con-
struction described in the proof of Theorem 3.1, it can be useful to work
though some examples. The examples are meant to be an overall intuitive
illustration of how the proof-theoretic definitions evaluate the validity of ar-
guments. They are presented in the framework of a decision procedure that
can be read off from the definitions.
The idea behind Definition 3.8 is roughly that an argument is valid if,
whatever we can obtain canonically from the conclusion, could as well be ob-
tained from the assumptions. A procedure to evaluate validity can therefore
be divided into two parts:
The complementation process determines what can be obtained from the
conclusion.
The search process looks for a way to obtain the same thing from the
assumptions.
Both complementation and search can employ only elimination rules —
there are no introduction rules available. In line with Definition 3.2, they
are based on a similar method (let us call it analysis) of applying elimina-
tion rules to a sentence, taken as major premiss, until an atomic sentence is
obtained (clause (ii) of Definition 3.7). Thus, in the complementation pro-
cess, the conclusion of the argument is analysed, in order to see what atomic
conclusions can be obtained (possibly under some additional auxiliary as-
sumptions). In the search process, the assumptions are then analysed (one
by one), in order to evaluate whether the same atomic conclusions can be
obtained.
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In the complementation process, the following simplifications are adopted,
without loss of generality, with respect to ∨E and →E (in agreement with
the corresponding cases in the proof of Theorem 3.1):
(→E) the minor premiss is assumed.
A→ B A
B
Here, A is an additional assumption and will be available to search.
(∨E) applications are “flattened” with the help of implication.
A ∨B
A→ C [A]
C
B→ C [B]
C
C
In order to maintain generality, C stands for a sentence that does not
occur as a subsentence either in the assumptions or the conclusion.
Here, A→C and B→C are assumed and will be available to search.
(⊥E) applications are abstained. The search will then target ⊥. Notice that
these simplifications are limited to the complementation process and
do not carry over to the search process where, naturally, applications
of ⊥E are not abstained.
Example 4.1. A definition of validity is expected to provide precise criteria
for the validity of arguments and, for our definitions in particular, these
criteria are supposed to resort to elimination rules only (without assistance
from introduction rules). Consider a simple, but not trivial, argument
A→ (B ∧ C)
(A→B) ∧ (A→ C)
and let us evaluate its validity with respect to our definitions.
First, we investigate what can be obtained canonically from the conclusion
by means of complementation:
A→ (B ∧ C)
(A→B) ∧ (A→ C)
A→B A
B
A→ (B ∧ C)
(A→B) ∧ (A→ C)
A→ C A
C
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There are two complementations, with conclusions B and C, respectively,
and the assumptions A→ (B ∧ C) and A. In order to establish validity, we
must now find canonical arguments from A→ (B ∧C) and A to B, and from
A→ (B ∧ C) and A to C.13 The search for these canonical arguments can
be done mechanically by analysing the assumptions one by one, where some
heuristics could be employed to sort out the most promising candidates. In
this example, we have few assumptions and don’t need much heuristics to
see that A→ (B ∧ C) is the best candidate:
A→ (B ∧ C) A
B ∧ C
B
A→ (B ∧ C) A
B ∧ C
C
The procedure is thus revealed to be strong enough to validate, not only the
introduction rules on the basis of the elimination rules, but also complex ar-
guments whose derivation would require both eliminations and introduction
rules.
Example 4.2. Regarded as a decision algorithm, the procedure for evaluation
of validity based on elimination rules is not so straightforward and uncompli-
cated as Example 4.1 makes it out to be. In the general case, the procedure
may involve recursion and backtracking. The search process can deliver can-
didates with critical subarguments, which would demand a recursive call to
evaluate their legitimacy (Definition 3.6). If unsuccessful, the process back-
tracks and tries out the analysis on a different assumption. Consider, for
instance, the argument
A→¬¬B
¬¬(¬A ∨B)
The complementation below stops at the conclusion ⊥, before an appli-
cation of ⊥E, in accordance with the aforementioned simplifications to the
complementation process.
A→¬¬B
¬¬(¬A ∨B) ¬(¬A ∨B)
⊥ (C1)
13The assumptions of the complementations happen to be the same in this example. In
the general case, however, they have to be considered separately, e.g. each complementa-
tion has their own assumptions and conclusion. In order to establish validity, we must then
show that the conclusion of the complementation can be obtained from the assumptions
of the complementation, for every complementation.
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The search process has assumptions A → ¬¬B and ¬(¬A ∨B) to try out
in order to obtain ⊥. For simplicity of exposition, we heuristically select
¬(¬A ∨B), but could as well have unsuccessfully tried A → ¬¬B out and
backtracked here. ¬(¬A ∨B) ¬A ∨B
⊥
Now, notice that ¬A∨B itself is not available among our assumptions. There-
fore we presume that ¬A∨B can, in fact, be obtained from the assumptions
that are available to us, and recall the procedure recursively on the critical
subargument enclosed in a box below.14
¬(¬A ∨B)
A→¬¬B ¬(¬A ∨B)
¬A ∨B
⊥ (S1)
In the complementation of our recursive call, we again adhere to aforemen-
tioned simplifications and use C as the conclusion of ∨E since it does not
occur anywhere else.
A→¬¬B ¬(¬A ∨B)
¬A ∨B
¬A→ C [¬A]
C
B→ C [B]
C
C (C2)
In order to obtain our foreign C, the search must either (1) obtain ⊥, and
thereby C, or (2) obtain one of the disjuncts and thereby obtain C from
the corresponding assumption, either ¬A→ C or B→ C, or yet (3) obtain
C by ∨E from a disjunctive principal sentence, whereby we may use the
disjuncts as additional assumptions on the search for proper subarguments
for the respective vertical minor premisses. We examine the second option
and choose assumption ¬A→ C. The other one may be discarded.
¬A→ C
A→¬¬B ¬(¬A ∨B)
¬A
C (S2)
14Notice that ¬(¬A∨B) appears twice: as major premiss and also as an assumption of
the critical subargument. This cannot be avoided in general and is related to the problem
of contraction in the search for proofs in the sequent calculus [5].
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Our next recursive step reveals an important aspect of the definitions. Con-
sider the next complementation.
A→¬¬B ¬(¬A ∨B)
¬A A
⊥ (C3)
In the candidate (S3) below, if we were to retain all the assumptions available
for the next recursive call, that is, if A→ ¬¬B and A where both passed as as-
sumptions to the critical subargument enclosed in a box, we would be in dan-
ger of running into a vicious circle (a loop): after the complementation (C4)
below, the candidate (S2) above could have been considered by the search.
Indeed, by Definition 2.7, the argument from {A→ ¬¬B,A,¬(¬A ∨B)} to
¬B has higher complexity than the critical subargument in (S2), because its
conclusion ¬B has the same degree than ¬A and it has A as an additional
assumption. Therefore, for the particular case with A → ¬¬B as princi-
pal assumption, the search must consider only candidates where A or some
other assumptions is left out of the critical subargument, on pain of violating
the complexity restriction. As it turns out, we do not need A→ ¬¬B either.
A→¬¬B A
¬¬B
¬(¬A ∨B)
¬B
⊥ (S3)
More recursion. ¬(¬A ∨B)
¬B B
⊥ (C4)
We see the complexity restriction at work again in the candidate offered by
the search below (notice that ¬(¬A ∨B) is left out of the critical subargu-
ment).
¬(¬A ∨B)
B
¬A ∨B
⊥ (S4)
I think that the procedure should be clear enough by now for us to omit the
last recursive call.
The construction described in Theorem 3.1 can be applied to the canonical
arguments produced by complementation and search in order to obtain a
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derivation.
¬(¬A ∨B)(1)
A→ ¬¬B A(2)
¬¬B
¬(¬A ∨B)(3)
B(4)
¬A ∨B
⊥
¬B (4)
⊥
¬A (2)
¬A ∨B
⊥
¬¬(¬A ∨B) (1),(3)
The derivation contains four tracks. If we order the tracks from one to four
and divide them into their analytic and synthetic parts, they correspond
roughly to the complementation and search processes of the procedure: (C1),
[(C2), (C3)], (C4) and (C5) (omitted) correspond to the synthetic parts of
tracks 1, 2, 3 and 4; (S1), (S3) and (S4) correspond to the analytic parts of
tracks 1, 2 and 3 (the analytic part of track 4 is empty). The simplifications
adopted with respect to ∨E in the complementation process resulted in a
dedicated recursive step for applications of ∨I in the derivation (in track 2,
(C2) and (S2); in track 4, (C5) and (S5)). This seems a reasonable exchange
against the achieved separation between the processes and deterministic char-
acter of the complementation.
5 Discussion
Dummett’s pragmatist justification procedure rejects a widely accepted dog-
ma of proof-theoretic semantics: the primacy of the categorical over the hy-
pothetical or, as it is also called, the placeholder view of assumptions [20, 21].
According to this view, assumptions are placeholders for closed proofs and
thus hypothetical reasoning (reasoning from assumptions) are explained in
terms of categorical reasoning (proofs without assumptions). In contrast, the
pragmatist proof-theoretic notion of canonical argument considers arguments
from assumptions as primary and not to be explained away in terms of closed
arguments (proofs).
The prevalence of the placeholder view of assumptions has imparted
greater emphasis to assertions in detriment of other speech acts like denial or
supposition. In contrast, the approach presented in this paper indicate ways
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to widen the conceptual arena and thus accommodate interesting alternative
points of view.
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